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THE PATCHWORK PRIVACY PROBLEM: HOW THE UNITED
STATES’ PRIVACY REGIME FAILS TO PROTECT ITS BUSINESSES
AND DATA SUBJECTS
Christopher Cozzens*
I. INTRODUCTION
As a civilization, the modern world is generating a plethora of data,
and the rate of generation is compounding rapidly. As of 2013, 4.4
zettabytes of data made up the digital universe, and it was projected that
this number could expand to 44 zettabytes of data by the end of 2020.1
For perspective, streaming 44 zettabytes of high-definition-quality (HD)
video would take approximately 572 million years.2 The growth rate
can be described as exponential, with 90 percent of the world’s data
generated in the last two years alone.3
The world generating more data is a direct result of each individual
generating data at increasing speeds. Each person generates a
substantial amount of data each day; every person generated an
estimated 1.7 megabytes (MB) of data each second during 2020.4 For
scale, the original Super Mario Bros. video game, released in 1985,5

* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2022; B.A., University at Buffalo
2013. I would like to thank Professor David Opderbeck for his thoughtful guidance
throughout my Comment-writing process. I would also like to thank the members of the
Seton Hall Law Review for their friendship, comradery, and support over the last two
years.
1 EMC DIGIT. UNIVERSE, THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE OF OPPORTUNITIES: RICH DATA AND THE
INCREASING VALUE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2014), https://www.emc.com/leadership/
digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm.
2 Bernard Marr, Big Data: What is a Brontobyte?, WORLD ECON. F. (Feb. 12, 2015),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/02/big-data-what-is-a-brontobyte/
(calculating 1 petabyte of HD video would last 13 years).
3 Jacquelyn Bulao, How Much Data is Created Every Day in 2020?, TECH JURY: BLOG,
https://techjury.net/blog/how-much-data-is-created-every-day/ (last updated Feb. 6,
2022).
4 Id.
5 Chris Plante, When was Super Mario Bros. Released in the US? Nobody Knows!,
VERGE (Sept. 14, 2015, 2:20 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/9/14/9324833/
super-mario-brothers-30th-anniversary-date.
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which contained 32 independent and in-depth levels,6 had a total
original file size of 32 kilobytes.7 That equates to .032MB, 53 times
smaller than the amount of data a person generated each second in 2020.
As we generate more data, technology is evolving to process that
data at accelerating rates. According to Moore’s Law, the computer
processing speed was projected to double every two years, but that
estimate has proven conservative, with the processing instead doubling
every 18 months.8 Moore’s Law “is just one manifestation of the greater
trend that all technological change occurs at an exponential rate.”9 Some
commentators have posited that in the 21st century, we could
experience “20,000 years of progress (at today’s rate).”10 As the
technology field expands at a shocking pace, statistically speaking,
consumers, businesses, and other data generators are exposed to more
cybercrime than ever before.
Data breaches pose one of the biggest cybersecurity threats. Data
breaches have become more prevalent in recent years, exposing
consumers to an increased risk that their personal information will be
exposed to nefarious hackers.11 According to the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, an organization dedicated to protecting privacy, there
have been over 9,000 reported data breaches since 2005.12 The real
number is likely magnitudes higher as this data does not include
unreported breaches or breaches that do not involve U.S. citizens.13 In

Super Mario Bros., NINTENDO WIKI, https://nintendo.fandom.com/wiki/Super_
Mario_Bros (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
7 Preston Phro, More Mario Trivia Than You Can Fit in King Koopa’s Castle,
SORANEWS24 (July 9, 2014), https://soranews24.com/2014/07/09/more-mario-triviathan-you-can-fit-in-king-koopas-castle [https://web.archive.org/web/202101131344
29/https://soranews24.com/2014/07/09/more-mario-trivia-than-you-can-fit-inking-koopas-castle/].
8 Moore’s Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/
Moores-law (last updated Dec. 26, 2019).
9 Big Idea: Technology Grows Exponentially, BIG THINK (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://bigthink.com/think-tank/big-idea-technology-grows-exponentially.
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN: DATA
INSIDER BLOG (Dec. 1, 2020), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches
(“In 2005 alone, 136 data breaches were reported by the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse. . . . [However,] the 2015 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report
covered over 2,100 data breaches in which more than 700 million records were exposed
for the year 2014 alone.”).
12 Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://privacyrights.org/databreaches (last visited Nov. 10, 2020) (downloaded data set and summed the total rows,
each row represents one data breach).
13 Abi Tyas Tunggal, 116 Must-Know Data Breach Statistics for 2021, UPGUARD: BLOG,
https://www.upguard.com/blog/data-breach-statistics (last updated Dec. 5, 2021).
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2019 alone, there were 1,473 reported data breaches.14 In total, those
breaches consisted of over 10,387,398,893 customer records.15 Even
more shocking, a cyberattack occurs every thirty-nine seconds,16 and
some commentators predict that a business will fall victim to a
ransomware attack every two seconds by 2031.17 At this alarming rate,
it is not a matter of if your data will be stolen, but when.
Once data is breached, the costs start stacking up for the affected
business. It is estimated that the average cost of a data breach in the
United States is $7.91 million to the affected business.18 “Studies show
29% of businesses that face a data breach end up losing revenue.19 Of
those businesses, 38% experience a loss of 20% of [sic] more.”20 This
lost revenue is likely a side effect of the reputational harm associated
with a data breach.21 Depending on the severity, data breaches can
result in a complete loss of data, which can force companies to shut
down operations.22 The longer operations stop, the more likely the
business will suffer greater reputational harm and revenue impact.23
J. Clement, Cyber Crime: Number of Breaches and Records Exposed 2005-2020,
STATISTA (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-breachesrecorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/ [https://
web.archive.org/web/20201206081157/https://www.statista.com/statistics/
273550/data-breaches-recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-andrecords-exposed/].
15 Data Breaches, supra note 12. In total, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse database
shows those breaches comprised of 10,387,398,893 customer records. Id.
16 Michel Cukier, Study: Hackers Attack Every 39 Seconds, UNIV. OF MD. A. JAMES CLARK
SCH. OF ENG’G: NEWS (Feb. 9, 2007), https://eng.umd.edu/news/story/study-hackers-attack-every-39-seconds. For a discussion on the differences between cyber attacks and
data breaches, see Tom Webley & Philip Thomas, Crisis Management: Data Breaches and
Cyber Attacks, REED SMITH: PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Dec. 17, 2019), https://
www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2019/12/crisis-management-data-breachesand-cyber-attacks (“A cyber attack is broader than a data breach, is deliberate and can
be more disrupting to business.”).
17 Sam Cook, 2018-2022 Ransomware Statistics and Facts, COMPARITECH (Jan. 28,
2022) https://www.comparitech.com/antivirus/ransomware-statistics/.
18 Ryan Brooks, What to Know About a Data Security Breach, NETWRIX: BLOG, https://
blog.netwrix.com/2018/11/29/what-to-know-about-a-data-breach-definition-typesrisk-factors-and-prevention-measures/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2022).
19 Maddie Davis, 4 Damaging After-Effects of a Data Breach, CYBINT (July 25, 2019),
https://www.cybintsolutions.com/4-damaging-after-effects-of-a-data-breach/.
20 Id.
21 Doug Drinkwater, Does a Data Breach Really Affect your Firm’s Reputation?, CSO
(Jan. 7, 2016, 3:55 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3019283/does-a-databreach-really-affect-your-firm-s-reputation.html (referencing a survey “conducted by
OnePoll, [finding] 86.55 percent of 2,000 respondents stated that they were ‘not at
all likely’ or ‘not very likely’ to do business with an organization that had suffered a
data breach involving credit or debit card details”).
22 Davis, supra note 19.
23 See id.
14
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Additionally, survey research shows that in the event of a breach,
consumers are quick to turn their backs, with 65 percent of data breach
victims reporting lost trust in an organization as a result of a breach.24
“Additionally, 85% [of consumers] will likely tell others about their
negative experience, with 33.4% using social media and 20%
commenting directly on a company website.”25 All of this leads to a
troubling result: 60 percent of small businesses impacted by a data
breach close their doors within six months of an attack.26 Furthermore,
because small businesses tend to be easier to attack, they are the victims
of 60 percent of hacks.27 From the business side of a data breach, the
goal of data breach legislation should focus on minimizing data breaches
to protect smaller businesses.
While the damages to businesses are concerning, the damages to
the affected data subjects are shocking. By 2018, two-thirds of people
online have had their records stolen or compromised by bad actors.28
Many data subjects have already had their data accessed multiple times.
For example, utilizing a recent calculator produced by the New York
Times,29 between 2005 and 2019, my personal:
• home address was accessed six times;
• credit card information was accessed four times;
• date of birth was accessed five times;
• email was accessed nine times;
• employment history was accessed once;
• financial history was accessed once;
• name was accessed ten times;
• passport number was accessed once;
• passwords were accessed eight times;
24 CENTRIFY, THE IMPACT OF DATA BREACHES ON REPUTATION & SHARE VALUE 12 (2017),
https://www.centrify.com/media/4772757/ponemon_data_breach_impact_study_uk.pdf.
25 Davis, supra note 19; see also Interactions Finds 45 Percent of Shoppers Don’t Trust
Retailers to Keep Information Safe, INTERACTIONS (June 26, 2014), https://www.interact
ionsmarketing.com/press-releases/interactions-finds-45-percent-of-shoppers-donttrust-retailers-to-keep-information-safe/ [https://web.archive.org/web/2021020100
5417/https://www.interactionsmarketing.com/press-releases/interactions-finds-45percent-of-shoppers-don’t-trust-retailers-to-keep-information-safe/].
26 Id.
27 Data Security Breach: 5 Consequences for Your Business, AME GRP.,
https://www.theamegroup.com/security-breach/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
28 CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME: NO SLOWING DOWN 4
(2018),
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/economic-impact-cybercrime.pdf.
29 K.K. Rebecca Lai et al., How Many Times Has Your Personal Information Been
Exposed to Hackers?, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/07/29/technology/personaltech/what-parts-of-your-informationhave-been-exposed-to-hackers-quiz.html.
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• cellphone number was accessed seven times; and
• social security number was accessed twice.30
The rate that consumers experience data breaches is intensifying
rapidly year after year. The total number of identity theft and fraud
complaints increased from 2.9 million in 2017 to 4.7 million in 2020.31
Thus, the chances are high that your personal information is already in
the hands of immoral actors.
Furthermore, data breaches often lead to much more harmful
consequences. Experian has published statistics showing that 31
percent of data breach victims later have their identity stolen.32 “There
is a new victim of identity theft every two seconds in the United States
alone.”33 These consumers reported $905 million in total fraud losses
in 2017, a 21.6 percent increase from 2016.34 This equates to a median
loss of $429.35 Once the data subject learns that they have been exposed
to a breach, they must decide how to protect themselves, which some
commentators believe is impossible.36 Data subjects will face a series of
challenges, in part, because of the current patchwork privacy regime in
the United States.
This Comment will examine the current landscape of data breach
legislation to identify how data breach legislation contributes to the
startling statistics outlined above, and how data breach legislation poses
problems for data subjects and businesses alike. Specifically, this
Comment will propose a federal privacy law that identifies reasonable
security measures that businesses can comply with to prevent data
breaches. Such a law should provide a private right of action if those
measures are not met. Part II will provide a general overview of the
current patchwork privacy regime in the United States and discuss the
current framework of data breach privacy legislation. Next, Part III will
discuss the difficulties businesses inevitably run into when attempting
to comply with fifty different state statutes. Part IV will look to the
private right of action provisions, or lack thereof, in several state

Id.
Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INST.,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime (last
visited Feb. 18, 2022).
32 Matt Tatham, Identity Theft Statistics, EXPERIAN (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/identity-theft-statistics/.
33 All Data Breaches in 2019 & 2020 – An Alarming Timeline, SELFKEY (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://selfkey.org/data-breaches-in-2019/.
34 Tatham, supra note 32
35 Id.
36 See Lai et al., supra note 29 (“How can you protect yourself in the future? It’s
pretty simple: You can’t.”).
30
31
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statutes to identify multiple discrepancies and gaps in protections that
often leave data subjects bearing the costs of privacy. Finally, Part V will
propose a federal solution to address the ambiguity by advocating for a
federal private right of action. Furthermore, Part V will look to existing
“sectors” to identify measures that businesses should take to prevent
data breaches and better protect both themselves and data subjects. In
sum, this Comment will first advocate for a solution that shifts the costs
of privacy from the data subject to businesses and, provides businesses
with reasonable guidelines to increase data security, thereby decreasing
data breaches and the overall “cost” of privacy in the future.
II. THE UNITED STATES’ SECTORAL APPROACH TO FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS AND
THE PATCHWORK OF STATE LAWS FOR DATA BREACH NOTIFICATIONS
A brief analysis of the current United States privacy system
uncovers several key issues that should be addressed. This Part will
outline the high-level framework of the privacy rights afforded to United
States citizens.
Starting broadly, there is no right to privacy in data conveyed to
third parties.37 The American legal system has typically denied legal
rights for data privacy and instead relies on self-regulation and
the litigation process to dictate appropriate behavior in society.38 Any
protections that exist for information privacy are generally assembled
from a combination of narrowly targeted rules.39 The combination of
these specific rights leaves substantial gaps resulting in fewer clear
remedies for violations of reasonable information practices.40
But the prevailing mindset may be shifting. In United States v. Jones,
Justice Sotomayor stated in a concurring opinion that “it may be
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties.”41 Justice Sotomayor specifically noted that this
reconsideration might be necessary because of the context of the digital
age, where people provide a plethora of information about themselves
to third parties every day.42
The increased focus on privacy should also expand in the context
of data collected by businesses. In the business environment, because
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 877
(2002).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
42 Id.
37
38
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of the accelerating speed at which data is collected and the amount of
data collected during this process, the data collected by third parties is
more closely analogous to data stored on a cell phone43 rather than the
trash in your trash bin44 or bank-statements.45 Because the amount of
data collected is enormous, it is time to reconsider the notion that an
individual does not have a right to data privacy.
While there is no general constitutional right to data privacy,
legislative rights exist. Generally, privacy in the United States is
governed by a patchwork of state and federal laws.46 Federal privacy
statutes in the United States follow a sectoral approach to privacy which
is governed by various regulations covering specific industries such as
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) for financial institutions,47 Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for the medical
industry,48 and Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) for
the education field.49 While at first there were many gaps between
sectors that left some companies unregulated entirely, today, larger
companies may be regulated by multiple sectors, creating confusion and
causing complicated compliance requirements.50
In addition to the federal regulation of certain sectors, states have
enacted privacy statutes with various degrees of protection, including
individual data breach notification statutes. Data breach state
legislation has been rapidly evolving throughout the United States. The

43 See generally Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (holding that a search of a
cell phone incident to arrest violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment privacy
interests, due in part, because of the massive amounts of private information contained
on the phone).
44 See generally California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment for trash on
public streets because the plaintiff voluntarily left the trash in a public area suited for
public collection and thus did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy).
45 See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s bank records because there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to the bank).
46 Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2019).
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 6801–6809.
48 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2020).
49 See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
50 Daniel J. Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy Law,
TEACHPRIVACY (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teachprivacy.com/problems-sectoral-approachprivacy-law/ (“Tech companies are getting into health. Cable companies are providing
Internet and phone. Various organizations perform functions of many different
industries, such as schools, which perform financial services, health services, and so
on.”).
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first such law was enacted in 2002.51 By 2014, twenty-three states had
introduced or considered data breach laws.52 In the following years, the
remaining states quickly enacted statutes. As of early 2018, Alabama
became the last state to enact a data breach notification law.53 Today,
all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring private or
governmental entities to notify individuals of security breaches
involving personally identifiable information.54 Part III will explore the
difficulties that businesses of all sizes face when attempting to comply
with the varying standards in these data breach statutes.55
While some commentators still consider the United States privacy
regime to be inadequate,56 some states are taking a proactive approach
to protect individual rights.57 States are gradually realizing the
importance of data privacy laws and are beginning to implement more
comprehensive privacy protections. For example, New Jersey has
introduced the New Jersey Disclosure and Accountability Transparency
Act (NJ DaTA), which establishes particular requirements for the
disclosure and processing of personal information.58 Furthermore, as of
February 2022, twenty-two states have introduced comprehensive
privacy bills, which are still pending at varying stages of the legislative
process.59
51 Data Breach Notification Laws by State, ITGOVERNANCE, https://www.itgovernanceusa.com/data-breach-notification-laws (last updated July 2018).
52 See 2014 Security Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 23,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2014-security-breach-legislation.aspx (listing the states that had proposed or
finalized legislation on data breaches in 2014).
53 Data Breach Notification Laws by State, supra note 51.
54 Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 17,
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
55 See discussion infra Part III.
56 See generally Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and
Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reformingus-approach-data-protection (arguing that a “simpler and more comprehensive
approach to individual digital dignity is warranted . . .” in part because “[t]he United
States lacks a single, comprehensive federal law that regulates the collection and use of
personal information”).
57 See generally Chris Cwalina et al., Nine States Pass New and Expanded Data Breach
Notification Laws, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 27, 2019), https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2019/06/nine-states-pass-new-and-expanded-data-breach-notificationlaws/ (exploring recent state amendments to their data breach laws to include more
encompassing privacy protections).
58 Assemb. 3283, 219 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020).
59 Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation Tracker, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PRO.,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ (last updated Feb. 17,
2022).
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The most comprehensive state legislation is likely California’s
recently enacted California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA),
which went into effect at the beginning of 2020.60 The CCPA focuses on
the protection of individual rights by providing consumers with: (1) the
right to know all data businesses collect about them;61 (2) the right to
request deletion of their data;62 (3) the right to enforcement by the state
Attorney General;63 and (4) the right to a private action against
companies that experience a data breach.64 Some commentators
consider the CCPA to be groundbreaking in the United States because it
provides “consumers with unprecedented rights to access, protect, and
delete data collected about them.”65 Other states offer fewer protections
than California. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, legislation is rapidly
expanding, and other states are expected to pass significant privacy
laws.66
The sectoral approach to privacy at a federal level combined with
the varying levels of protection offered from state to state make
compliance challenging for businesses of all sizes. While support is
increasing for a “comprehensive, national privacy law that would
supersede and preempt state privacy laws,” it will not likely happen for
several years.67 The United States may look to international standards
for inspiration, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

60 Bianca Karim, Cause of Action for Breach of Data Security for Consumers’
Information, 85 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 635 (2020).
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(a) (West 2020) (“A consumer shall have the right to
request that a business that collects a consumer’s personal information disclose to that
consumer the categories and specific pieces of personal information the business has
collected.”).
62 Id. § 1798.105(a) (“A consumer shall have the right to request that a business
delete any personal information about the consumer which the business has collected
from the consumer.”).
63 Id. § 1798.155(b) (“The civil penalties provided for in this section shall be
exclusively assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of
the State of California by the Attorney General.”).
64 Id. § 1798.150(a)(1) (“Any consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted
personal information, as defined [within] . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and
exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’s violation of the duty to
implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to
the nature of the information to protect the personal information may institute a civil
action[.]”).
65 Anne Logsdon Smith, Alexa, Who Owns My Pillow Talk? Contracting, Collaterizing,
and Monetizing Consumer Privacy Through Voice-Captured Personal Data, 27 CATH. U.J.L.
& TECH. 187, 223 (2018).
66 Data Protection Laws of the World, DLA PIPER, https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/?t=law&c=US (last modified Jan. 24, 2022).
67 Id.
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in the European Union,68 which has broader applicability and prioritizes
the protection of individual rights.69 Without an omnibus approach, the
current system of privacy protection in the United States makes
compliance difficult for good faith businesses that prioritize data
security and leaves data subjects unprotected.
III. THE UNFEASIBLE MISSION OF COMPLYING WITH FIFTY DIFFERENT STATE
STATUTES
Companies that do business in multiple states may find it difficult,
if not impossible, to comply with the different requirements included in
the data breach regulations across fifty states. This Part will highlight
some of the difficulties that businesses of all sizes face under the United
States’ current patchwork privacy regime. Security breach laws
typically have provisions regarding who must comply with the law (e.g.,
businesses, data or information brokers, government entities, etc.);70
how to define “personal information” (e.g., name combined with SSN,
driver’s license, state ID, account numbers, etc.);71 what constitutes a
breach (e.g., unauthorized acquisition of data);72 what are the
requirements for notice (e.g., timing or method of notice, who must be
notified);73 and what exemptions are available (e.g., for encrypted
Karim, supra note 60.
Barrett, supra note 46, at 1060.
70 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-38-2(2) (2018) (defining a covered entity as “[a] person,
sole proprietorship, partnership, government entity, corporation, nonprofit, trust,
estate, cooperative association, or other business entity that acquires or uses sensitive
personally identifying information”); W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101(2) (2008), (“‘Entity’
includes corporations, business trusts, estates, partnerships, limited partnerships,
limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies, associations, organizations,
joint ventures, governments, governmental subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
or any other legal entity, whether for profit or not for profit.”).
71 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90(D)(3) (2021) (defining personal identifying
information as “the first name or first initial and last name in combination with . . . social
security number; driver’s license number . . . financial account number, or credit card
[number] . . . other numbers or information which may be used to access a person’s
financial accounts . . .” but “does not include information that is lawfully obtained from
publicly available information, or from federal, state, or local governmental records”);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a) (2021) (including information such as date of birth and
mother’s maiden name).
72 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(1) (2021) (“‘Breach of the security system’
means unauthorized acquisition of computerized data when access to personal
information has not been secured by encryption or by any other method or technology
that renders the electronic files, media, or databases unreadable or unusable.”); FLA.
STAT. § 501.171(1)(a) (2021)(“‘[B]reach’ means unauthorized access of data in
electronic form containing personal information.”).
73 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (requiring notice to attorney general and
consumers); id. § 51-30-05 (requiring either written notice, electronic notice, or
substitute notice, which includes email, posting on company website, or notice to major
68
69
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information or publicly available information).74 Some of these
definitions overlap from state to state; however, even these basic
provisions may have differences in their construction and language
making it a headache for businesses to comply with each one.
For example, every state’s statutes cover financial information,
such as credit card numbers, along with any passwords associated with
that information.75 Yet, just four states’ statutes protect biometric data,
including things like fingerprints and retina images.76 Only one of those
states extends the protections to DNA.77 While most states consider
email and password sensitive information, California and Florida do not
cover “your mother’s maiden name, which is often used as a security
question.”78 Furthermore, most states have a provision that the
notification requirement is only triggered if stolen personal information
is unencrypted data or if the encryption key is also stolen.79 Thus,
merely knowing when a breach is significant or personal enough to
trigger a warning can be complicated.
Another example that illustrates the difficulties that a good faith
business may encounter when attempting to comply with all fifty states’
laws is the notification timelines required from state to state. Once a
company has gone through the process described above to identify if
statewide media). But see W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-102 (2008) (declining to incorporate
any notification requirement to the attorney general).
74 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(2) (2021) (“The term [personal information]
does not include . . . information that is encrypted”); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.590(11)
(2021) (Washington excludes an exception for “secured” information. “‘[S]ecured’
means encrypted in a manner that meets or exceeds the national institute of standards
and technology standard or is otherwise modified so that the personal information is
rendered unreadable, unusable, or undecipherable by an unauthorized person.”).
75 Michael Keller, Holiday Shopping? How Much Do Data Breach Notification Laws
Protect?, ALJAZEERA AM. (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/12/to-catch-a-breachhowmuchdodatabreachnotificationlawsprotect.html.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.090(7) (West 2020) (“‘[P]ersonal information’
means information in any form on an individual that is not encrypted or redacted, or is
encrypted and the encryption key has been accessed or acquired”) (emphasis added);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-552(C) (2021) (“A person that maintains unencrypted and
unredacted computerized personal information that the person does not own or license
shall notify, as soon as practicable, the owner or licensee of the information on
discovering any security system breach . . . .”) (emphasis added); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110105(a)(1) (2021) (“Any person or business that acquires, owns, or licenses
computerized data that includes personal information shall disclose any breach of the
security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach of the security of
the system to any resident of Arkansas whose unencrypted personal information was, or
is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.”) (emphasis
added).
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personal information was compromised and which statute(s) may be
implicated, they must then recognize how quickly they need to notify
the affected data subjects. Timelines can range from “immediately
following discovery [of the breach]”80 or “in the most expeditious time
possible and without unreasonable delay”81 to “not later than ninety
days after the discovery of [the] breach[.]”82
Furthermore, some states add additional requirements such as
“within 45 days . . . [after a] determination that a breach has occurred
and is reasonably likely to cause substantial harm . . . .”83 Additionally,
several states require that the notifications be made to the Attorney
General,84 while others put conditions on the Attorney General
notification85 or forego that requirement altogether.86 All of these
conflicting requirements inevitably confuse companies who do business
in multiple states, resulting in inadequate compliance and impacting
some data subjects as a result.87 A more comprehensive, uniform
standard would make compliance with notification timelines more
attainable.
While no state has passed legislation comparable to the CCPA,
there are promising legislative trends focused on providing consumer
protection and creating “norms” across the entire United States.88 These
norms may make compliance slightly less complicated. The legislative
trends include amendments that have: (1) expanded definitions of
“personal information” (e.g., to include biometric information, email

MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704(2) (2021).
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.010(b).
82 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b(b)(1) (2021).
83 ALA. CODE § 8-38-5(b) (2018) (emphasis added).
84 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 14-3504(h) (West 2019) (“[A] business shall
provide notice of a breach of the security of a system to the Office of the Attorney
General.”).
85 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (2021) (“In addition, any person that
experiences a breach of the security system as provided in this section shall disclose to
the attorney general by mail or electronic mail any breach of the security system which
exceeds two hundred fifty individuals.”) (emphasis added).
86 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12 (West 2015) (omitting any attorney
general notification requirement).
87 Luke Irwin, Data Breach Notification Requirements, IT GOVERNANCE USA BLOG (Dec.
16, 2019), https://www.itgovernanceusa.com/blog/when-should-an-organization-report-a-data-breach (“Organizations that conduct business across all 50 states therefore
have a considerable compliance challenge.”).
88 See 2020 Security Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 4,
2020) https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2020-security-breach-legislation637299951.aspx.
80
81
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address with a password, passport number, etc.);89 (2) reduced the time
window within which businesses must report a breach;90 (3) required
reporting of breaches to the state attorney general;91 and (4) provided
for free credit freezes or identity theft protection for victims of data
breaches.92 These trends are a step in the right direction to raise the
privacy protections afforded to data subjects in the United States.
Despite these trends, the fact that each state has a unique statute
makes compliance tricky, if not nearly impossible, for businesses of all
sizes. Certainly, the trends are narrowing the gaps between the state
laws. A uniform federal solution would minimize the compliance
problem by providing businesses of all sizes with one set of proper rules.
IV. THE PATCHWORK PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION PROVIDED TO PEOPLE ACROSS
THE UNITED STATES
On the other end of the data breach is the affected data subject. In
addition to the business challenges described above, data subjects are
not adequately protected by existing legal remedies. This Part will
briefly discuss the current landscape of private actions afforded to data
subjects once their data has been breached. Generally, a private right of
action allows injured parties to sue on their behalf for damages caused
by another’s violation of federal or state statutes, rather than rely on

89 See, e.g., Chris Cwalina et al., Nine States Pass New and Expanded Data Breach
Notification Laws, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 27, 2019), https://www.dataprotection
report.com/2019/06/nine-states-pass-new-and-expanded-data-breach-notificationlaws/ (analyzing Washington H.B. 1071, which expanded the definition of personal
information “to include the following categories: birthdate; unique private keys for
signing electronic records; student, military, or password identification numbers;
medical information; biometric information; and online login credentials”); id. (“New
Jersey’s law expands the definition of ‘personal information’ to include usernames, email
addresses, passwords, and security questions and answers affiliated with an individual’s
online account.”).
90 See, e.g., S.H.B. 1071, 2019 AMS WM S3925.1 (Wash. 2019) (shortening the
notification timeline from forty-five days to “thirty calendar days after the breach was
discovered”).
91 See BAKERHOSTETLER, DATA BREACH CHARTS 16 (2018), https://www.bakerlaw.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Breach_Charts.pdf
(referencing Arizona’s data breach law “[e]ffective Aug. 1, 2018, if the breach requires
notification of more than 1,000 individuals, notification must be made to the attorney
general and the three largest nationwide consumer reporting agencies”).
92 See, e.g., H.B. 4806, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2018) (“If a person . . .
experienced a[] [qualified breach] . . . and such breach of security includes a social
security number, the person shall contract with a third party to offer to each resident . . .
credit monitoring services at no cost to said resident . . . .”).
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public enforcement by authorities who may be unable—or unwilling—
to bring cases for the benefit of a single individual.93
As a threshold matter, in the wake of a data breach, merely finding
a right of action can be quite difficult.94 The general theories of recovery
range from common law causes of action (including negligence, breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment) to remedies derived from state and
federal statutes (including data breach notification and unfair and
deceptive trade practice statutes).95 Ultimately, there is no clear path
forward for recovery post-data breach. Recent attempts to fit data
privacy within existing rights have met strong court resistance.96 As a
result, “creative new theories offer attractive instruments for redress.”97
Nonetheless, these theories face significant challenges, starting with
identifying a legally enforceable right of action.98
After a large data breach, consumers from multiple states may be
affected, and a class action suit may be initiated. Class actions are often
considered because it would be inefficient for individuals to bring claims
due to the limited amount they can recover.99 When faced with a classaction lawsuit, courts will often analyze claims under various states’
data breach notification statutes—potentially, even all fifty state
statutes. When it comes to a private right of action, courts categorize
the statutes in one of four ways: (1) statutes that expressly provide a
private right of action;100 (2) statutes that contain an explicit attorney
general enforcement clause;101 (3) statutes that are ambiguous or
93 See William E. Kovacic, British Institution of International & Comparative Law
Third Annual Conference on International and Comparative Competition Law: The
Transatlantic Antitrust Dialogue, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 15, 2003), https://
www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/private-participation-enforcement-publiccompetition-laws (“Private rights of action diminish, if not eliminate, the gate-keeping
authority of public prosecutors and reduce their ability to control the development of
policy by their selection of cases. Specifically, independent private rights to prosecute
deny prosecutors the capacity to modulate the law’s application by deciding to
prosecute some violations more aggressively and prosecute other offenses less
vigorously.”).
94 See Justin H. Dion & Nicholas M. Smith, Consumer Protection—Exploring Private
Causes of Action for Victims of Data Breaches, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 253, 268–70 (2019)
(describing the lack of a private right of action under federal statutes such as the HIPAA,
GLBA, COPRA, and FTCA acts).
95 Karim, supra note 60, §§ 4–7.
96 Reidenberg, supra note 38, at 877.
97 Id. at 890.
98 Id.
99 See 140 AM. JUR. TRIALS 327 § 8 (2015).
100 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§
14-3508 (West 2008).
101 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN § 4-110-101 (2005) (providing that a “violation of this
chapter is punishable by action of the Attorney General under the provisions of § 4-88-

COZZENS (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

4/7/22 4:21 PM

COMMENT

1171

provide non-exclusive remedy clauses;102 and (4) statues that are silent
to the matter.103 Citizens in states that provide a right of action can clear
the first hurdle but may face other issues, as discussed below.
On the other end of the spectrum, some states do not expressly
provide a private right of action. Resultingly, data subjects living in
these states may face an immediate obstacle in their attempt to recover
for any harm suffered. While these statutes generally do not explicitly
preclude a private action, courts have interpreted certain provisions in
the statute to deny an avenue of recovery.104 Courts have interpreted
statutes that contain an explicit attorney general enforcement clause to
close the door on a private right of action from a data breach notification
standpoint.105 Courts have interpreted both permissive clauses (i.e.,
“the AG may . . .”)106 and mandatory language (i.e., “the AG shall . . .”)107
to deny a private right of action and dismiss these claims at the pleading
stage.
Various statutes that include explicit attorney general enforcement
provisions also include non-exclusive remedy provisions.108 If the
statute provides a non-exclusivity clause, courts will generally find that
this creates ambiguity as to whether a private right of action exists and
101 et seq.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-107 (West 2006) (“[T]he primary regulator may
bring a civil action to enforce compliance” with the state’s data-breach notice statute.);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 6 (2007) (stating that the “attorney general may bring an
action . . . to remedy violations of this chapter”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-806 (2018)
(providing that “the Attorney General may issue subpoenas and seek and recover direct
economic damages for each affected Nebraska resident injured by a violation of” the
data-breach notice statute).
102 In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1169 (D.
Minn. 2014) (classifying claims brought under Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, and Wyoming statutes to be considered to have “[a]mbiguous language or
non-exclusive remedies”).
103 See In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1341
(N.D. Ga. 2019) (analyzing Wisconsin’s data breach notification law and determining
that it is silent as to the question of whether a private right of action exists).
104 Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69.
105 Id.
106 Id. (“Texas’s data-breach notice statute provides only for attorney general
enforcement, stating repeatedly that ‘[t]he attorney general may bring an action to
recover the civil penalt[-y, -ies] imposed under this subsection . . . .’”) (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 1168 (dismissing a private claim at the pleadings stage under Connecticut’s
data breach notification provision which states, “violations of the statute ‘shall be
enforced by the Attorney General’” because the language “clearly limits enforcement
power to the state’s attorney general” exclusively); Equifax Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d at 1340
(dismissing the Connecticut plaintiffs’ claims because the statutory language “explicitly
limits enforcement to the Attorney General”).
108 Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1169 (classifying claims brought under Colorado,
Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, and Wyoming statutes to be considered to have
“[a]mbiguous language or non-exclusive remedies”).
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will not dismiss these claims at the pleadings stage.109 Though, if the
statute includes both an attorney general enforcement clause and a
nonexclusive remedy provision, courts may still deny a private right of
action to the data subject.110 Since many states do not include
nonexclusive remedy provisions, an affected consumer in these states
will have to rely on other public enforcement procedures in their
respective states.111
Unfortunately, these public enforcement mechanisms are often
inadequate or selective. A contributing factor to this is the lack of
defined statutory rights surrounding data breaches which, in turn,
creates ineffective public enforcement mechanisms.112 For example, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can assert claims through the FTC’s
“‘unfair and deceptive trade practice’ jurisdiction.”113 Companies may
violate a state’s unfair and deceptive trade practice laws when they
“inaccurately describe their information handling practices.”114 The
prosecution for deceptive trade practices is generally focused on
curbing the company’s deceptive practices, not on compensating the
victim for any harm they suffered.115
Inadequate focus on stopping harmful conduct can result in
companies abusing the system. Perhaps, a large company may decide to
pay a fine for violating the statute rather than notify the customers and
risk greater loss from a damaged reputation.116 For example, Arizona’s
statute, which is enforceable only by the state attorney general, allows
data subjects to bring an action, but caps the civil penalty at $5,000.117
109 See id. (declining to dismiss plaintiffs’ Colorado claim because “Colorado’s databreach notice statute provides that the ‘attorney general may bring an action . . . to
address violations of this section,’ but also provides that the ‘provisions of this section
are not exclusive.’”); id. (declining to dismiss Delaware claims because the nonexclusive
remedy provisions indicate that “it is at least ambiguous whether there is a private right
of action”).
110 Equifax Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d at 1339–40 (analyzing the attorney general
enforcement provision in conjunction with the nonexclusive remedy provision which
states, “‘the remedies provided by this section shall be in addition to any other lawful
remedy available’” but ultimately concluding that a conflicting provision in the statute
which states, “‘the provisions of this section shall be exclusive and shall preempt any
provisions of local law . . . and no locality shall impose requirements that are
inconsistent with or more restrictive than those set forth in this section’” to preclude
against a private right of action despite the nonexclusive remedy provision).
111 See Reidenberg, supra note 38, at 885.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 885–86.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 886.
116 See id. (“A company risks liability by making a disclosure, but does not risk
accountability by remaining silent.”).
117 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7601 (2006).
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For large corporations, the costs associated with data security can be in
the hundreds of millions of dollars.118 Thus, the companies who have
the most data about consumers may be better off foregoing the costs
associated with preventing breaches and simply paying the penalty, if
they are caught.
This is just one example of how existing public enforcement
mechanisms can be abused, which can lead to inadequate protection of
data subjects. It follows that under the current landscape, consumers
may be forced to bear the costs of a data breach. Instead, companies
should be held accountable via a private right of action, thereby shifting
the cost of a data breach onto the company itself. Accountability will
inspire companies to invest into their data security practices in fear of
large class action settlements from a data breach. In turn, the market,
overall, will become more secure and the breach frequency should
decrease, thereby exposing data subjects to less harm.
The issues presented in this Part highlight one major roadblock and
the consequences that the minor differences in statutory language have
created, which exacerbate the need for a federal solution to protect data
subjects more adequately. Predominantly, the goal should be to limit
the number of breaches, increase data security, and reduce the risk to
consumers. Allowing companies to cut corners will continue to expose
data subjects to unnecessary risks. A federal privacy regulation should
take both the businesses’ and consumers’ goals into account to provide
a comprehensive scheme to protect both sides.
V. A PROPOSED FEDERAL SOLUTION
The amount of data breached has risen steadily since 2005.119 It is
estimated that a business will fall victim to a ransomware attack every
two seconds by 2031.120 As this problem continues to rapidly expand,
the urgency of a federal solution is mounting. This Part will examine a
proposed solution to address the two main issues discussed above, i.e.,
providing a private right of action to affected data subjects and
establishing uniform guidelines for businesses to follow.121 By
118 Steve Morgan, Global Cybersecurity Spending Predicted to Exceed $1 Trillion From
2017–2021, CYBERCRIME MAG. (June 10, 2019), https://cybersecurityventures.com/
cybersecurity-market-report/ (“Jamie Dimon, chairman and CEO at J.P. Morgan Chase &
Co. . . . states that the financial services giant spends roughly $600 million each year on
cybersecurity[.]”).
119 Daniel Funke, By the Numbers: How Common Are Data Breaches—and What Can
You Do About Them?, POLITIFACT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/article/
2019/sep/23/numbers-how-common-are-data-breaches-and-what-can-/.
120 Cook, supra note 17.
121 See discussion supra Parts III–IV.
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addressing these two main issues, a federal privacy regulation can shift
the cost of data breaches to the business sector, which is more apt to
shoulder the cost via a private right of action. Once the business bears
the burden, it will be more incentivized to increase its security measures
accordingly as per a set of proposed uniform guidelines. In theory, this
will decrease the breach frequency and lower the overall “cost” of data
breaches as a whole.
First, when it comes to the private right of action, establishing a
federal regulation with a private right of action will incentivize
companies to comply with defined procedures and protect consumers if
their data is inevitably breached. Under the current landscape, “[t]he
real search behind the efforts to remedy privacy violations is a search to
create new legal rights.”122 For now, the movement for privacy
enforcement continues to expand in search of a proper remedy to
disrupt the current scheme that protects the privacy violators.123 This
must be addressed in any federal approach.
Currently, without federally defined statutory rights, companies
are not held legally accountable, and there is a lack of liability for
improper treatment of personal information in the private business
world.124 Large data breaches highlight potential issues with the
current scheme and bring those issues into the public spotlight and
“provide[] an incentive for legislative action to establish greater legal
certainty for the treatment of personal information.”125 There have
been recent attempts to address the existing statutory gaps using
federal legislation.126 For example, former Attorney General Eric Holder
has advocated for a federal standard to “simplify” and “strengthen”
consumer protections.127 Additionally, members of Congress have
already attempted to propose several data breach laws, but for various
reasons, they have not provided adequate protection to those whom

Reidenberg, supra note 3838, at 898.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Michael D. Simpson, Comment, All Your Data Are Belong to Us: Consumer
Data Breach Rights and
Remedies in an Electronic Exchange Economy, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 669, 688 (2016)
(footnotes omitted) (“For example, bills introduced during the 113th Congress included
the Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, which would have
imposed personal data privacy and security requirements on interstate businesses and
created both public and private rights of action for violations.”).
127 Keller, supra note 75.
122
123
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“these laws are supposed to protect.”128 As the debates rage on,
ordinary people remain exposed and vulnerable without sufficient
options to recover under the existing scheme.129 Action must be taken
sooner rather than later to curtail this exposure and protect the United
States citizens.
Some attorney generals have expressed concerns about a national
system.130 For example, Connecticut Attorney General George Jepsen
has concerns that a federal solution “could reduce the number and
effectiveness of regulators at the state level who fight data breaches.”131
Additionally, Maryland Attorney General Douglas Gansler stated a valid
concern that a federal regulation “should not preempt state
enforcement. Any federal standards should be a floor, not a ceiling,
allowing states to enact stricter standards.”132 Conversely, some
commentators believe California’s strict new protections are the reason
for the lack of a federal solution.133
The argument that the national law should create a floor is enticing;
however, it does not address the difficulties that businesses will face in
complying with different state regulations. If the federal rule is simply
a floor, each state would still be free to enact stricter laws which may
eventually lead back into the patchwork privacy problem that we are
currently facing. Furthermore, the longer we wait to set a national
standard, the more exposed data subjects may be in states with lesser
protections. By setting a baseline for security measures that businesses
must comply with, the overall security of the private sector will be
increased, and thus, the frequency of data breaches should decline.
Consequently, the United States should revamp the current privacy
regime entirely and take into account both issues described above. At
the forefront, there must be a private right of action to allow consumers
a path to recovery and hold businesses accountable. Furthermore, there
must be defined reasonable security measures, whether included in the

128 Drew Mitnick, No More Waiting: It’s Time for a Federal Data Breach Law in the U.S.,
ACCESSNOW (Apr. 10, 2018, 10:51 AM), https://www.accessnow.org/no-more-waitingits-time-for-a-federal-data-breach-law-in-the-u-s/.
129 Id.
130 Tod Newcombe, States Approach Federal Data Breach Law with Caution,
GOVERNING (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-federal-cybersecurity-law.html.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Daniel Castro & Ashley Johnson, Why Can’t Congress Pass Federal Dave Privacy
Legislation? Blame California, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.: INNOVATION FILES (Dec. 13,
2019),
https://itif.org/publications/2019/12/13/why-cant-congress-pass-federaldata-privacy-legislation-blame-california.
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statute itself or accompanying regulations, that guide good-faith
businesses to raise the security of the industry entirely.
A. Including a Private Right of Action for Data Subjects Whose
Information is Breached
First and foremost, any federal solution should include a private
right of action. Private rights of action have worked in other industries
to incentivize corporations to strengthen their internal processes and
invest in safeguards to minimize potential lawsuits and thus protect
consumers.134 Civil litigation has made dangerous machines safer,
improved product safety through tort law, and improved the safety of
motor vehicles.135 None of this would have been possible had these
industries been regulated by inadequate and underfunded regulatory
regimes akin to the current patchwork privacy framework.136 Private
rights of action can “‘catalyz[e] a societal shift toward a thicker notion
of industrial responsibility,’ as it did with mass environmental torts and
product liability.”137 Private claims bring adverse publicity and expose
industry practices that may provoke productive “industry-wide
changes.”138 To date, any changes that have occurred in the privacy
world still fall short.139
The federal solution must be careful not to weaken existing
protections offered to customers via the various statutes.140 Any new
federal standard must not prevent states from adding protections. A
federal data breach law should not create a ceiling preventing more
strict state enforcement but should create a baseline that states can
build upon;141 although the floor should be high enough to protect most
citizens adequately and to avoid falling back into the same abyss we are
in. Perhaps the federal solution can find inspiration from the CCPA to
create a privacy framework that mandates companies to take

Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 831
(2020).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 832 (alteration in original) (quoting Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy
Litigation as a Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 574 (2017)).
138 Reidenberg, supra note 38, at 898.
139 Id.
140 G.S. Hans, White House Data Breach Legislation Must be Augmented to Improve
Consumer Protection, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Jan. 16, 2015), https://cdt.org/insights/white-house-data-breach-legislation-must-be-augmented-to-improve-consumer-protection/.
141 Mitnick, supra note 128.
134
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reasonable security measures to protect personal information.142 This
would provide a baseline that the legislature can build upon as the
digital universe continues to expand.
Still, a federal solution may need to build upon the framework of
the CCPA. The CCPA provides that a “consumer whose nonencrypted
and nonredacted personal information . . . is subject to an unauthorized
access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’s
violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures . . . may institute a civil action[.]”143 Though, the CCPA does
not define what reasonable security measures would entail.144 This
leaves businesses open to potentially crippling liability if they fall below
the ambiguous definition of “reasonable security procedures.”
Under the CCPA, if a litigant can bring a private right of action as
described above, they may “recover damages in an amount not less than
one hundred dollars ($100) and not greater than seven hundred and
fifty ($750) per consumer per incident or actual damages, whichever is
greater.”145 Thus, if a business has only 100,000 records compromised
(a relatively small amount in the world of big business), it could
potentially be liable for up to $75,000,000 resulting from a class-action
lawsuit. Due to the theoretically massive settlements coupled with a
vague definition of reasonable security measures, a private right of
action will likely open a large stream of litigation. A federal solution
must take this into account and provide businesses of all sizes with a
more detailed roadmap of what constitutes reasonable security
measures. By doing so, it would accomplish several key goals: (1)
ensuring the customer data is more secure by incentivizing businesses
to implement up-to-date security measures; (2) allowing businesses to
protect themselves from potentially crippling liability by complying
with delineated security measures; (3) reduce the burden on the courts;
and (4) provide consumers a clearer path to recovery if businesses fail
to comply.

142 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West 2018) (“Any consumer whose
nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information, as defined [within] . . . is subject
to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the
business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the
personal information may institute a civil action[.]”) (emphasis added).
143 Id. (emphasis added).
144 IAN C. BALLON, Litigation Risks and Compliance Obligations Under the California
Consumer Privacy Act, in E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW 26-400, 26-425 (2019).
145 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).
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B. Simplifying the Requirements to Make Compliance Attainable
Next, a federal solution must consider the needs of the businesses
that will need to comply with the law. One major factor which currently
plagues these businesses under the existing patchwork approach is the
lack of standards outlining what actions they can take to adequately
protect consumer information (and thus comply with the law). Any
federal solution should look to define a floor of protections that will
allow good-faith businesses to enact security procedures designed to
protect both data subjects from a breach and the business itself from
liability. This can be done by defining “reasonable security measures”
either in the statute or accompanying regulations.
Some “sectors” have already delineated what is considered a
“reasonable security measure.”146 If the United States chose to
implement a federal data breach/privacy regulation, it could build upon
these existing laws. A proposed federal solution could model
reasonable safety measures after the GLBA’s Safeguards Rule. While the
GLBA applies solely to financial institutions, several concepts can be
expanded into the framework of a data breach statute. The GLBA
outlines reasonable security measures, which in turn incentivize
financial institutions to increase their data protection strategies,
thereby increasing security and decreasing potential breaches.147
Under the GLBA, the precautions that businesses must take to be
considered “reasonable” can be broken down into three categories: (1)
employee management and training safeguards;148 (2) information
systems safeguards;149 and (3) detecting and managing systems
safeguards.150

146 For examples of several sectors delineating the security measures, see 16 C.F.R. §
314.4 (2021) for the GLBA safeguards rule and 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (2021) for the HIPAA
security rule.
147 See Stephen E. Breidenbach & Terese L. Arenth, Navigating the Ambiguous
Requirement of ‘Reasonable Security’ Measures While Protecting Personal Information,
N.Y. L.J. (May 8, 2020, 2:10 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/
05/08/navigating-the-ambiguous-requirement-of-reasonable-security-measureswhile-protecting-personal-information/ (“As most businesses collect and maintain
sensitive personal information about their customers, the key takeaway is to first assess
the type of business that you operate and the types of personal information that you
collect. From that starting point, develop, implement and maintain a sound security plan
to collect only the information that you need, to keep that information safe, and to
dispose of it securely. This will form the foundation to help your business meet its legal
obligations and protect that sensitive data.”).
148 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b)(1) (2021).
149 Id. § 314.4(b)(2).
150 Id. § 314.4(b)(3).
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First, the category of employee management and training
safeguards refers to developing programs to ensure that employees
adopt good security practices, such as basic requirements like strong
computer passwords, which are updated regularly.151 The FTC
guidelines delineate several specific examples to consider, including: (1)
background checks when hiring employees;152 (2) “limiting access to
customer information to employees who have a business reason to see
it”;153 (3) “training employees on the basic steps to maintain security,
confidentiality, and integrity”;154 (4) “developing policies for employees
who telecommute”; (5) “imposing disciplinary measures for security
policy violations”;155 (6) “preventing terminated employees from
accessing customer information by immediately deactivating their
passwords and user names”;156 and (7) “tak[ing] steps to ensure the
secure transmission of customer information.”157 These are several of
the delineated measures in the FTC regulations for the GLBA, but this is
not an exhaustive list of the types of safeguards that financial
institutions may want to consider.158
Second, the GLBA outlines several key information systems
safeguards that companies should consider. According to § 314.4(b)(2),
“information systems include network and software design, as well as
information processing, storage, transmission, [retrieval,] and
disposal.”159 As per the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards
for Safeguarding Customer Information, established by the Department
of the Treasury, the final guidelines require “an institution to consider
the need for access controls in light of the institution’s various customer
information systems and adopt such controls as appropriate.”160 Some
of these measures are quite simple, such as storing records in a room or
cabinet that is locked when unattended, while some are more
cumbersome, such as ensuring that storage areas are protected against
151 Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards
Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/
guidance/financial-institutions-customer-information-complying.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards
Rule, supra note 151.
158 Id.
159 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b)(2) (2021).
160 See Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer
Information and Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness, 66 Fed.
Reg. 8616, 8622 (Feb. 1, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 30).
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destruction or damage from physical hazards like fires or floods. One of
the most important aspects of information security is the assurance of
secure transmission of customer information. The FTC recommends
that “when [covered institutions] transmit credit card information or
other sensitive financial data,” they should use a “secure connection, so
that the information is protected in transit.”161 If financial institutions
transmit sensitive data by email over the Internet, the information
should be encrypted to reduce the possibility of data theft.162 Again,
these regulations delineate guide rails for institutions, which can be
flexible depending on the business size and needs.163
Finally, detecting and managing systems safeguards are intended
to prevent hacks or system-wide failures. According to the FTC, typical
safeguards that a company could put in place include, but are not limited
to: (1) “keep[ing] logs of activity on [the] network and monitor[ing]
them for signs of unauthorized access to customer information”;164 (2)
“us[ing] an up-to-date intrusion detection system”;165 (3) “monitor[ing]
both in- and out-bound transfers of information for indications of a
compromise, such as unexpectedly large amounts of data being
transmitted from [the] system to an unknown user”;166 and (4)
“insert[ing] a dummy account into each of [the] customer lists and
monitor[ing] the account to detect any unauthorized contacts or
charges.”167 The FTC Safeguard Rules encourage financial institutions
to look to industry standards and best practices.168
Perhaps a federal data breach solution could define a baseline of
reasonable security measures similar to the scheme in the GLBA to
achieve the goal of protecting the entire business storage system. By
detailing what “reasonable security measures” entails, the legislation

Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards
Rule, supra note 151.
162 Id.
163 Id.; Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer
Information and Rescission of Year 2000 Standards for Safety and Soundness, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 8628 (“The Board believes that the compliance burden is minimized for small
institutions because the Guidelines expressly allow institutions to develop security
measures that are ‘appropriate to the size and complexity of the [institution]’.”).
164 Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards
Rule, supra note 151.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484,
36,488 (May 23, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 314) (stating that a business should
adopt “a program that has a continuous life cycle designed to meet the needs of a
particular organization or industry”).
161
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will guide good-faith businesses. In turn, those businesses will be able
to improve their security systems or be subject to liability for failing to
take reasonable action. As a result, this will improve the entire data
security landscape, reduce the number of breaches, lower the burden on
the court system, and protect data subjects.
At first glance, it may seem that this would increase the costs to the
business as they will have to implement these “reasonable security
measures.” Though, the costs will likely pale in comparison to the
potentially crippling class action suits that can be brought for a violation
of a statute like the CCPA.169 Under the current regime, the customers
bear the brunt of the costs associated with breaches. It is time that a
federal statute is enacted, allowing for a private right of action to shift
those costs to the businesses that are more equipped to handle the
expenses. Businesses will bear upfront costs to enact reasonable
security measures.170 Some estimate that these costs can rise upwards
of two million dollars for companies with more than five hundred
employees.171 But these investments will lead to increased security and
data will be breached less frequently. If a business can prevent a single
breach, it can save millions of dollars.172 Therefore, companies can cut
costs in the long run by investing in data security in the short term. For
any remaining risk, companies can invest in cyber insurance to protect
themselves in the event of a breach. The cyber insurance market is
growing and is expected to be a 28.6-billion-dollar industry by 2026.173
This helps spread the risk to the entire online industry and minimizes
the risk of catastrophic consequences to a single business.174 In turn, the
business sector is more protected while achieving the end goal of
protecting the consumer’s information and privacy.
See discussion supra Section V.A.
Nicole Lindsey, New Report Suggests Initial Compliance Costs for CCPA Could Reach
$55 Billion, CPO MAG. (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/
new-report-suggests-initial-compliance-costs-for-ccpa-could-reach-55-billion/
(stating that “small companies with less than 20 employees . . . are projected to average
around $50,000 [in compliance costs] . . . [a]t the top end of the range are companies
with more than 500 employees ($2 million or more in initial CCPA compliance costs)”).
171 Id.
172 See discussion supra Section V.A.
173 Cyber Insurance – H1, 2020 Market Highlights, COWBELL CYBER (June 22, 2020),
https://cowbell.insure/2020/06/22/cyber-insurance-h1-2020-market-highlights/.
174 Insurance 101, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/article/insurance-101 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2020) (stating that the central concept of insurance is to divide risk
“among many members of a group, then [the risks] need fall but lightly on any single
member of the group. Thus, misfortunes that could be crushing to one can be made
bearable for all. Viewed as a form of mutual aid, risk-sharing can be seen not only as
sound business practice, but as enlightened social behavior rooted in accepted
principles of ethics.”).
169
170
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The need for a federal solution to data privacy is mounting. As
sensitive and personal data is shared more rapidly than ever before,
Congress must take action to protect it. The goal of a federal privacy
regime should be to minimize the number of breaches that occur. In
turn, this will decrease the “cost” caused by data breaches. To achieve
this goal, the federal solution should provide businesses with a more
robust set of security guidelines. This will improve the privacy
protections afforded to data subjects immediately through increased
security measures in the market. Furthermore, the solution should
provide a private right of action to data subjects exposed in a breach that
results from a business not following those reasonable measures. This
will further incentivize businesses to invest in data privacy and security
in the short term, further strengthening the security measures in the
market. Any federal solution should keep these two fundamental
principles in mind to achieve the end goal of decreasing data breaches
in the long run.
VI. CONCLUSION
As data breaches continue to become prevalent, a federal solution
is more important now than ever. The current patchwork regime is too
complicated for businesses to comply with, which results in inadequate
protection of consumers’ privacy interests. The current model is a
reactive approach centering around notification only after the breach
has occurred and the damage has largely been inflicted. At our current
trajectory, it is not a matter of if the data will be stolen, but when. The
United States should opt to take a proactive approach to protect its
citizens and uphold their privacy interests. It is uncertain if a federal
solution will be implemented soon. If not, the citizens remain
vulnerable and are forced to shoulder the costs of a data breach. A
federal solution should implement a baseline floor for businesses across
the country to comply with. Furthermore, it should provide a private
right of action if businesses do not meet that floor. This will incentivize
businesses to invest in reasonable security measures, which will
decrease the breach frequency and shift the costs of data privacy off of
the shoulders of the citizens and on to the business sector which is more
apt to shoulder the expense.

